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Abstract
We observe that countries where belief in the American dream(i.e., e¤ort pays)
prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know from previous work that
beliefs are also correlated with several features of the economic system (taxation, social
insurance, etc). Our objective is to study the joint determination of these three fea-
tures (beliefs, punitiveness and economic system) in a way that replicates the observed
empirical patterns. We present a model where beliefs determine the types of contracts
that rms o¤er and whether workers exert e¤ort. Some workers become criminals, de-
pending on their luck in the labor market, the expected punishment, and an individual
shock that we call meanness. It is this meanness level that a penal system based on
retribution tries to detect when deciding the severity of the punishment. We nd
that when initial beliefs di¤er, two equilibria can emerge out of identical fundamentals.
In the American(as opposed to the French) equilibrium, belief in the American
dream is commonplace, workers exert e¤ort, there are high powered contracts (and
income is unequally distributed) and punishments are harsh. Economists who believe
that deterrence (rather than retribution) shapes punishment can interpret the mean-
ness parameter as pessimism about future economic opportunities and verify that two
similar equilibria emerge.
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1 Introduction
Societies that have laws must decide what to do when people violate these laws. An interest-
ing fact is that some societies, notably the US, choose punishments that would be considered
too harsh in other societies. For example, each year in the US a small number of individuals
receive capital punishment whereas in Europe killing o¤enders is not an option. More in-
teresting, perhaps, is the fact that the incarceration rates in the US are extremely high. In
the year 2004, for example, it exceeded 700 per 100,000 inhabitants, approximately 5 times
those observed in Europe. Anecdotal evidence suggests that even the everyday treatment
of prisoners in the US may be on the strict side. For example, a 1999 report states that
Maricopa County Jail in Arizona makes inmates pay for their meals, which some say are
worse than those for the guard dogs. Canines eat $1.10 worth of food a day, the inmate
90 cents, the sheri¤ (Joe Arpaio) says.1 Such treatment of inmates is not common in Eu-
ropean prisons. Interestingly, crime rates for most crime categories during the early 1990s
were comparable across the Atlantic (the notable exception being the homicide rate), while
Levitt (2004) documents a large decline -of the order of 30%- in virtually all crime categories
in the US during the later part of that decade. Indeed, the criminology literature does not
see the higher punitiveness of the American system as the consequence of higher crime rates.
For example, Tonry (1998) opens the introductory chapter to The Handbook of Crime and
Punishment with
American punitiveness is not the result of higher crime rates or of a steeper
increase in crime in recent years. For most serious crimes, Americas rates are not
the highest among Western countries (Mayhew and van Dijk 1997), and other
countries experienced equally sharp increases in crime rates during the 1970s and
1980s (Tonry and Hatlestad 1997, part 4). The di¤erence is attributable to crime
and punishment entanglement in American politics.2
We provide a theory of how a societys penal code and economic system are jointly
determined. We are motivated by the patterns observed across Europe and America. Recent
1The report states that there are chain gangs for men and women, that inmates are forced to wear old-
fashioned prison stripes and pink underwear, and that prohibited items include cigarettes, adult magazines,
hot lunches and television. This has come at considerable cost since the county has been hit with hundreds
of inmate-related lawsuits, and ordered to pay millions in legal damages.For example, in a case in April
1999, a jury awarded $1.5 million to an inmate denied medical treatment for a perforated ulcer. Reported in
Arizona criminals nd jail too - in tents, July 27, 1999, http://www.cnn.com/US/9907/27/tough.sheri¤/,
accessed July 26, 2006.
2The relative harshness of the american penal system is also emphasized in Whitman (2003) and the
literature which views punishment as a form of oppression linked to the economic order (see Waquant (1999,
2000) for a recent example).
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work, both by political scientists working on varieties of capitalism, and by economists
emphasizing redistributive institutions, has focused on the remarkable di¤erences in beliefs
across the Atlantic. Survey evidence reported in Alesina and Glaeser (2004) reveals that
the idea that e¤ort pays is more prevalent in America. When asked if the poor are lazy
or unlucky, over 60 percent of Americans while only 20 percent of Europeans answer that
the poor are lazy rather than unlucky. Piketty (1995) exploited these di¤erences in beliefs
to show how they can give rise to two economic systems that di¤er greatly in the amount
of government intervention even when the underlying economic processes are quite similar.3
Given that the punitiveness of the legal system and belief in the American dreamappear
positively correlated across countries (see also Section 2 below), a natural question to ask is
if these empirical patterns are predicted by models where beliefs, the penal system and the
economic organization are all simultaneously determined.4
At least two approaches are possible in an attempt to link a belief in the American
dream and the demand for punishment. The rst is a direct link: people who believe
e¤ort pays also happen to believe that punishment should be severe. Thus an exogenous
di¤erence in beliefs gives rise to a di¤erence in the demand for punishment. One example
of such a direct link is the argument presented in Lako¤ (1996) in favor of an ideological
typology where right wing individuals adhere to a strict fathermetaphor, who believe
3Work by economists includes Benabou and Ok (2001), Rotemberg (2002), Benabou and Tirole (2005),
Alesina and Angeletos (2005), inter alia. Related models (with less emphasis on di¤erences in beliefs) are
Banabou (2000), Saint Paul (2001), Hassler et al (2003) and Di Tella and MacCulloch (2003). The political
science literature on varieties of capitalismis large (see, for example, the contributions in Hall and Soskice
(2001) and the references cited therein) and goes back at least to Alexis de Tocquevilles Democracy in
America. Interestingly this book was written as a result of his trip to America with Gustave de Beaumont (a
public prosecutor at the court of Versailles) to study the American penal system which won them the French
Academys Montyon Prize (the book was Du systeme penitentiaire aux Etats-Unis et de son application en
France).
4There are, of course, other approaches to explain di¤erences in punishment without connecting them to
the economic system. A particularly simple one is to invoke discrimination. More severe punishment would
be observed in America if sentences where decided by one group and criminlas were perceived to belong to a
second, more disliked group. Indeed, race and crime appear closely connected in America and the evidence
documented in Glaeser and Sacredote (2000) is certainly consistent with discrimination in sentencing. We
are unaware, however, of evidence showing that states with larger proportion of black votes have also more
lenient sentencing. Another simple approach is to apply Beckers model of crime. Harsh punishment in
America could then be the result of of higher potential bounties for criminals and/or lower legal wages
realtive to Europe. Alternatively, one could follow Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) and argue that setting up
and running an institution requires a xed cost so that the supply of regulation is limited by the extent of
the market. Accordingly, one could argue that the administration of a serious judicial system is requires a
jurisdiction with a large population (such as the US relative to France). On justications used for sentencing
amongst legal scholars, see Tonry (1998).
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simultaneously that e¤ort pays and that criminals should be punished.5
An alternative approach, and the one we follow in this paper, is to try to derive the
connection between the choice of severe punishment on the one hand and the economic
system induced by a belief in the American dream on the other.6 In order to do this,
we compare two otherwise identical societies which start out with di¤erent beliefs with
respect to the role of luck relative to e¤ort in the determination of income. In our economy
beliefs about how much e¤ort pays determine the types of contracts that rms o¤er and
whether workers accept these contracts and exert e¤ort. The choice of becoming a criminal
critically depends on a shock that we call meanness. It is this meanness level that a
penal system based on retribution tries to determine when establishing the severity of
punishment. We nd that when initial beliefs di¤er, two equilibria can emerge out of identical
fundamentals. In the rst equilibrium, which following the literature we call American,
belief in the American dreamprevails, workers exert high e¤ort, there are high powered
contracts (income is unequally distributed) and punishment is harsh. In the second, French
equilibrium, workers exert low e¤ort and wages are independent of output. As in previous
work, there is the potential for multiple equilibria, although it is not the result of a failure
to experiment and nd the true value of some parameter because in our model beliefs are
correct in equilibrium (see the discussion in Section 7).
Economists who believe that deterrence (rather than retribution) shape punishment can
interpret the meanness parameter as pessimism about future economic opportunities and
verify that two similar equilibria emerge. A focus on retributionin a theory of punishment,
however, has several advantages (see also the discussion in Section 7). First, it is a correlate
of fairness, a human tendency for which there is growing empirical evidence.7 In this spirit,
Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000) nd that sentences respond to victim characteristics in a way
that is hard to reconcile with optimal punishment. Second, this empirical fact can easily
be accomodated in formal models. Interestingly, those with the best predictive t involve
an element of reciprocal altruism which is particularly relevant in dispensing justice (see,
for example, the models of Levine (2003) and Rotemberg (2005) where individuals respond
5The evidence available is consistent with both a direct link and an indirect through the economic system.
For example, Benabou and Tirole (2006) explain that believers in a just world are more likely to give sti¤
sentences to defendants convicted of a crime such as negligent homicide, but also to nd victims (e.g., in
a rape case) more culpable and deserving of their fate. Alesina, et al (2001) study data from the US
General Social Survey and nd that There is an extremely strong relationship between supporting capital
punishment and opposing welfare in the US. Indeed, the correlation of these opinions (which is fairly high
16 percent in the US) is hardly natural. However, it makes sense if opposition to welfare comes from a desire
to punish people who are seen as stealingfrom taxpayers.
6Nisbet and Cohen (1996), cited in Alesina et al (2001), link punitiveness in America to the importance
of the frontier, where the need to enforce uncertain property rights was salient.
7See the results from ultimatum and dictator games of Guth et al (1982) and Forsythe et al (1994).
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like with like and the process of detecting the amount of altruism in the other party
occupies center stage). Similarly, in our theory punishment occurs because voters want to
harm criminals who display low levels of benevolence towards others.8 Third, our focus on
retribution (rather than deterrence) is consistent with both practice and most work in other
disciplines dealing with the problem of punishment.
Finally, our paper is related to the economics literature on crime and punishment (see
Becker, 1968), particularly to work linking crime to redistribution (see, Harris 1970, Benoît
and Osborne 1995, Freeman, 1996, inter alia). For example, Benoît and Osborne (1995)
analyze two di¤erent policies, and their combinations, for ghting crime. One of them is
redistribution, so that the authors can also explain some of the empirical patterns that
motivate our study. In their paper, however, there are exogenous di¤erences in political
processes and type of crime, whereas we explain varying levels of punishment in societies
that are identical a priori.
In the next section we illustrate empirically some aspects of the connection between
beliefs and crime and punishment. We then present our model in Sections 3-6, a discussion
in Section 7 and then conclude.
2 Beliefs, Crime and Punishment: Empirical Illustra-
tion
Considerable evidence has been gathered on the importance of beliefs about self reliance
and the American dreamfor the choice of economic system, including the determination
of taxation, social insurance, education nance and the regulation of markets (see, Alesina
and La Ferrara 2001, Alesina, et al 2001, Fong 2001, inter alia). In this section we briey
describe the patterns present in the data available for the severity of punishment and beliefs.
We start with data on the severity of punishment. A rst observation is that the there are
several extreme features of the American penal system such as three-strikes-and-you-are-
out laws, mandatory minimum sentences laws and sexual psychopathlaws. Although we
lack formal comparative studies, these appear to be absent in other countries (but see Tonry
1998). A second point is that the US has extremely high levels of incarceration (interestingly,
even within America, incarceration rates are higher in the 38 states that allow for the death
penalty). Incarceration rates, however, are questionable as a measure of intended severity
given their dependence on crime rates and enforcement. Comparable data on severity of
sentencing is harder to come by. One well known di¢ culty in comparing legal systems
8Related theories of punishment appear in Benoît and Dubra (2004) and Di Tella and MacCulloch (2002),
although they do not have di¤ering lengths of sentences.
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across countries is the many potential measures of severity. One example is a detailed recent
US Department of Justice document comparing German and American prosecutions, which
states The overall percentage of defendants convicted is also similar, but the German system
has many more trials and acquittals and many fewer dismissed cases. In addition, Germany
imposes sentences much shorter than those imposed in the US.9
Survey data from the International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS), however, has asked
respondents in several countries a question on sentencing for a similar crime that can be used
to compare harshness of punishment for several countries.10 The exact question employed is
(all data is described in detail in Appendix 2)
Severity: People have di¤erent ideas about the sentences which should be given
to o¤enders. Take for instance the case of a man of 20 years old who is found guilty
of burglary for the second time. This time, he has stolen a colour TV. Which of the
following sentences do you consider the most appropriate for such a case (1) Fine, (2)
Prison, (3) Community service, (4) Suspended sentence, (5) Any other sentence.The
variable Severity was dened as a categorical variable equals -1 if the answer is category
(1), 0 if the answer is category (3), (4) or (5), and 1 if the answer is category (2).11
The raw data reveals that Severity is higher in the US than in Europe.12 The only
country in Europe with Severity comparable to the US is Northern Ireland (denoted NOR
in the graphs below).
Data on beliefs comes from the four waves of the World Values Survey. We employ 5
di¤erent questions. The rst is self placement on a 1 to 10 left-right scale. The answers
to this question are obviously country specic, but it is perhaps interesting to note that
9See, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/gap.htm accessed on August 1, 2006. Di¢ culties in com-
paring severity are due, in part, to di¤erences in the severity of pre sentencing inhibitions; in the severity of
the rst sentence; in the appeal system; in the e¤ective incarceration -e.g., after reductions for good behavior
or release under parole after serving the minimum required sentences; and di¤erences in treatment.
10There is reserach revealing considerable consensus amongst individuals regarding the rank order severity
of various o¤enses (Darley et al (1996), Kahneman, et al (1998) and Rossi et al, 1974).
11The correlations between this measure of severity and various measures of beliefs, GDP and
Income Inequality that we present in this section are robust to changes in the denition of Severity.
A natural alternative, which yields similar results, is to dene Severity equal to 1 if the answer is
category (2) or 0 otherwise.
12Of course, this data illustrates each countrys people desired level of severity, while our models predic-
tions will be about the severity chosen by the Government. It is unlikely, however, that a political economy
mechanism has driven punishment away from the socially desired level. For example, Cohen et al (2002) nd
that the public largely concurs with current sentencing decisions about incarceration and sentence length.
While Alesina et al (2001) report that 86% of respondents in the US think that the courts do not punish
criminals harsh enough, while 4% thought the courts were too harsh.
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on average French individuals self place more to the left than American respondents. In
order to provide more content to such ideological self descriptions, and to allow for better
international comparisons, we also focus on four other beliefs. They are
Unfair for Poor-L: A dummy equal to 1 if the answer to the question: Why, in
your opinion, are there people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions:
which comes closest to your view? (1) They are poor because of laziness and lack of
willpower, or (2) They are poor because society treats them unfairly. is (2) and 0 if
the answer is (1).
No EscapeL: A dummy equal to 1 if the answer to the question: In your opinion,
do most poor people in this country have a chance of escaping from poverty, or there
is very little chance of escaping? (1) They have a chance or (2) There is very little
chance.was was category (2) and 0 if it was category (1).
Government Help PoorL: The WVS question asked: Do you think that what the
Government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right amount,
too much, or too little? (1) Too much, (2) About the right amount, or (3) Too little.
Government Help PoorL was dened as taking the values 1, 2 and 3 if the answers
were (1), (2) or (3) respectively.
Business Ownership-L: The WVS question asked: There is a lot of discussion
about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements
comes closest to your opinion? (1) The owners should run their business or appoint
the managers, (2) The owners and the employees should participate in the selection
of managers, (3) The Government should be the owner and appoint the managers, (4)
The employees should own the business and elect the managers. Business Ownership-
L was dened as a dummy equals 1 if the answer is category (3) or (4) and 0 if the
answer is category (1) or (2).
The simple correlations presented below reveal that our measure of severity of punishment
is positively correlated with beliefs consistent with the American dreamand right wing
self placement (the variables are coded so that bigger numbers mean more left wing beliefs).
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As a reference we note that Severity is also positively correlated with GDP per capita
(measured in constant 2000 dollars) and the Gini coe¤cient (average 1989-2000, source:
8
World Bank, World Development Indicators).
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Finally, it is also worth describing the patterns in the raw data on crime rates across countries.
They reveal that overall crime rates are broadly similar across the US and Europe, with crime
in Europe being higher for several crime categories. The main exception is the homicide rate,
which is substantially higher in the US.13 A similar pattern is reported in Tonry (1998). The
following Table summarizes some of the evidence available
Table 1: Crime rates in the US and Europe
Crime1 Victim2 Car3 Property4 Sex5 Person6
US 5,375 24.2 19.6 10.8 2.5 5.7
Europe 7,983 25.2 19.0 9.6 2.9 4.0
Austria 6,285 18,8 11.7 6.6 3.8 2.1
Canada 9,979 25.2 17.3 13.1 2.7 4.0
England
and Wales 30.9 24.7 12.8 2.0 5.9
Finland 7,650 18.9 12.9 5.0 2.5 4.1
France 6,765 25.3 20.7 9.5 0.9 3.9
Netherlands 7,422 31.5 25.9 13.3 3.6 4.0
Sweden 12,670 24.0 20.0 7.5 2.9 4.5
Switzerland 5,116 26.7 18.6 9.0 4.6 3.1
Notes: (1) Crime is the Total recorded crime per 100,000 population from the United
Nations Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice
Systems, found at http://www.uncjin.org/Statistics/WCTS/wcts.html accessed on
August 1, 2006. All data is from 1994 except for the Netherlands which is for
1986. (2) Victim is the victimization rate (the proportion of the population
victimized in one year), for 1995 (the latest year available) in Mayhew, P. & Dijk,
J.J.M. van. (1997). Criminal Victimisation in eleven Industrialised Countries. Key
findings from the 1996 International Crime Victims Survey. The Hague: Ministry
of Justice, WODC (3) Car is victimization rates for car theft, theft from car, car
damage, motorcycle theft and bicycle theft from the same surveys (4) Property is
victimization for burglary, attempt at burglary, robbery and theft of personal
property from the same surveys (5) Sex is sexual offenses victimization from the
same surveys and (6) Person is assault and threat victimization from the same
surveys.
13Note that the evidence on severity of sentencing reported above relates to burglary, a simple economic
crime (for which the punishment is never the hotly debated death penalty).
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3 The Model
In this section we present a reduced form model of an economy with agency problems in
which the rm has a choice of technology. In this economy there is one rm, one worker and
the Government. In the rst period the rm must choose its technology and the worker must
simultaneously choose his e¤ort level. In the second period the worker chooses whether to
go to the crime market, and the Government simultaneously chooses the punishment level.
First Period
We now start with the description of the economy in the rst period. The rm can choose
a market technology, in which production levels depend on the e¤ort level exerted by the
worker, or it can choose a bureaucracy in which production is independent of e¤ort. For
h > m > l (high, medium and low), the prots for the rm are as follows: m if it chooses
the bureaucracy, and h or l if it chooses the market economy and the worker chooses high
or low e¤ort respectively. The workers total utility is given by his utility from the wage
minus his cost of e¤ort, which is e for high e¤ort, and 0 for low e¤ort. In the bureaucracy,
productivity does not depend on e¤ort, and neither does the wage which yields a utility of
uM . In the market technology output is stochastic, and the probability of a high output is
larger when the worker exerts e¤ort. In a manner consistent with agency models, we assume
that the rm o¤ers high powered contracts, in which the utility received by the worker is
lower when the output is low. Thus, we let buH be the utility of the worker derived from his
salary when output is high, and buL the utility of wages when output is low: For simplicity, buH
and buL are assumed given, as we only need the fact that, in the optimal contract, payment
in the good state is higher than in the low state. The expressions with the details of the
optimal contract were used throughout a previous version of the paper. Our key results do
not depend on this simplication. Payo¤s are presented in the following matrix, for p > r.
                  Technology Choice
Market Bureaucracy
High effort pû H  + (1-p) û L - e, πh u M  - e, π m
Worker
Low effort rû H  + (1-r) û L , πl u M     , π m
We assume that (buH   buL) (p  r) > e : p is high enough, relative to r; so that it com-
pensates the cost of e¤ort. With this assumption there are two equilibria in this stage of
the game: a market technology with high e¤ort , and a bureaucracy with low e¤ort (which
we call the American and French equilibrium respectively). Note that two interpretations of
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belief in e¤ort paysarise. First, e¤ort pays to the worker because putting in e¤ort yields
a higher output than low e¤ort when the rm chooses the Market technology. This corre-
sponds to the notion of a Nash equilibrium. Second, given a choice of Market technology by
the rm, exerting e¤ort yields a higher expected output. This notion of belief correlates with
the standard view in economics of a belief as a distribution of probabilities over an unknown
parameter p (the distribution is degenerate in that we know with probability 1 the true value
of p). See Section 7 for a discussion. Our emphasis on the role of e¤ort is consistent with the
evidence in Alesina, et al (2005), who study di¤erences in hours worked across Europe and
America. They state: hours worked per person ... are almost 50 per cent less in Europe
than in the US. (Figure 1). Americans average 25.1 working hours per person in working
age, Italians 16.7, French 18.0 and German 18.7.
It may be worth emphasizing that the timing of the decisions by the worker and the rm
can be interpreted in ways consistent with di¤erent timings than the one we present. For
example, consider a game where the rm moved rst, but in which the worker was uncertain
either about the rms action or about his payo¤ conditional on the rms choice.14 This
would yield a coordination problem similar to the one we present. The role of the rather
articial assumption of a simultaneous game is simply to capture the idea that when workers
fail to believe in the American dream, they will not be seduced by a rm o¤ering the
market technology. Conversely, when rm owners do not believe in e¤ort pays, they will fail
to believe that workers will exert e¤ort.
Second Period
In the second period of the model, after his rst period in the job and after observing the
payo¤, but before collecting it, the individual receives a shock a¤ecting his taste for crime.
The individual must then decide whether to collect his market wage, or engage in crime
(discarding his wage) and the Government must choose the punishment level. Regarding
the workers decision, the interpretation is that the market wages are a rst signal about
his lifetime income, or his rst paycheck, and he must decide whether to continue in the
market, or go (forever) into the crime market.15 If he goes honest, he collects his wages,
and the taste shock is irrelevant. If he goes for crime, his payo¤ is u + ; where u is the
expected utility of crime and and  is the taste shock. In order to link the punishment
14Uncertainty about the rms choice of action arises if all aspects of the choice of technology are not
veriable to the worker.
15There is evidence of serial correlation in wages (see for example, Baker et al, 1994). Also, we have
modeled the career choice between crime and market activities as a static problem, and not one in which
the individual can move back and forth between the two paths. There is some evidence that crime is an
absorbing state in the sense that once the individual enters crime it is unlikely that he will get out. For
example, Lanagan and Levin (2002) report that among nearly 300,000 prisoners released in 15 States in
1994, 67.5% were rearrested within 3 years. A prior study estimated this number at 62.5%.
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rate, or sentencing rate, with the utility of the individuals we assume that the direct utility
from crime is a continuous function u = u (a; b; t) where a is the probability of aprehension,
and b is the bounty. In order to simplify our analysis, we take a and b as xed, exogenous
parameters, and we concentrate on the variable t; time in jail.16 We also assume that u ()
is decreasing in t: The taste shock  is his meanness (a large  is a mean individual) which
is drawn from a density f that is positive in its support [min; max] and has a cumulative
distribution function F .
In his decision about whether to enter the crime market, the individual compares his
market utility u with u+  and commits a crime if and only if u < u+ : This  parameter
can be interpreted in two ways. First, our preferred interpretation is that of a taste for crime
or meannessshock, so that retributionmotive for punishment is natural. Similar results
can be obtained if one interprets the shock as pessimism: a large  means that individuals
perceive the economic prospects in the legal market are bleak, and are pushed into the crime
market. In this case we can use a deterrencetheory of punishment.17
The Government must choose the time in jail for a criminal, which in turn determines
u: In other words, once the Government has proved that the individual has committed a
crime it must decide the time he or she must spend in jail t: The Government has a utility
v (t; ) of punishing with t years a type : For a belief g about the types of criminals, the
Government must choose t to maximizeZ
v (t; ) g () d:
Note that prior beliefs are not related to an observable type (otherwise the process would
reect discrimination and would be invalid). We will assume that for some increasing function
q, v (t; ) =   (q ()  t)2 : This functional form captures the idea that if the Government
knew that an individual was of type ; it would set a punishment of q (), and since q is
increasing, it means that the Government wants to punish worse individuals more. In
particular, for any belief g of the government, it must choose t to maximize its utility
argmax
t
 
Z
(q ()  t)2 g () d  t = Egq (1)
This functional form, which is how we model the retributive theory of punishment, only
serves to simplify our analysis (the main results do not hinge on the specic form). In the
retributiontheory of punishment that we employ, this function captures the societal desire
16Although a and t can be considered partial substitutes, since both would a¤ect deterrence of crime, it
is more natural in the context of this paper to concentrate on t; which is chosen once the judge knows that
the individual has commited a crime, and is thus more related to the altruism-mens rea dimensions that we
explore in this paper. On this issue see the interesting paper by Mookherjee and Png (1992).
17See Becker (1968), Ehrlich (1975), Shavell (1987), Benoit and Osborne (1995), inter alia.
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to respond to the meanness of the criminal.18 There is a philosophical debate that makes a
distinction between the meanness of the act and the meanness of the individual who commits
this act, that we do not address in this paper. We assume that retribution means giving
harsher punishment to meaner individuals, as measured by a higher ; and note that it is
consistent with the practice of several legal systems (including the US and the UK). It is
also consistent with the legal theories of Primoratz (1989), Kleinig (1973) and Davis (1992),
who place a great deal of emphasis on the state of mind(mens rea) of an alleged o¤ender,
in such a way that, other things being equal, the criminal with the more malicious state of
mind deserves the harsher penalty.
We note that modeling simultaneous action choices by the worker and Government is an
attempt to keep pureour analysis of punishment as retribution. The reason is that if the
Government moved rst, it would take into account the e¤ect of its punishment level on the
behavior of the workers-criminals, making the theory work as a deterrence model.
4 A Simple Example
In order to show how our model works, we now present a simple example with the probability
of high output, given e¤ort equal to 1 and the probability of high output with low e¤ort
equal to 0:
Market Bureaucracy
High effort û H - e, πh u M  - e, π m
Worker
Low effort û L , πl u M     , π m
We normalize output in France (Bureaucracy with Low E¤ort) to uM = 1 and set US
(Market technology, High E¤ort) GDP per capita to be buH = 1:4, which is consistent with
observed di¤erences in income adjusted by purchasing power parity. Also, set e = 1=10 andbuL < 1; for example buL = 1=2: Finally, let the expected utility of the worker when time in jail
is t; be u (t) = 2 t, and let the utility of the Government be given by v (t; ) =   (q ()  t)2
with q () = 4
3
. The density of types  is f , uniform on [ 2; 2] ; so that F (x) = (x+ 2) =4.
We will now show that in equilibrium, the optimal punishment in America is tA = 13=5;
while in France it is tF = 2:
18In a deterrence interpretation the objective of the Government would be to minimize crime rates.
Thus, the relationship between the time in jail and the v(:) would be determined by the way in which
criminals react to harsh sentencing.
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When the workers know that tA = 13=5; they commit crimes i¤
 > buH   e  u  tA = buH   e   2  tA = 7
5
  1
10
 

2  13
5

=
19
10
: (2)
Given that types were uniformly distributed in [ 2; 2] ; the conditional expectation of  given
that  > 19=10, is the midpoint of the interval between 19=10 and 2 : E ( j crime) = 39=20:
Then, by equation (1), the optimal punishment is
tA = E (q j crime) = E (4=3 j crime) = 4
3
E ( j crime) = 4
3
39
20
=
13
5
as was to be shown.
Similarly, after the French equilibrium, when workers know that tF = 2; they will commit
crimes if and only if
 > uM   u
 
tF

= uM  
 
2  tA = 1: (3)
This yields a conditional expectation of types (the midpoint between 1 and 2) ofE ( j crime) =
3=2: By equation (1) the optimal punishment is
tF = E (q j crime) = E (4=3 j crime) = 4
3
E ( j crime) = 4
3
3
2
= 2
as was to be shown.
In order to complete the example, one only needs to check that Low E¤ort-Bureaucracy
and High E¤ort-Market Technology are still equilibria of the rst stage (when workers know
what awaits them in the second period). This is easy and ommitted.
In this simple example there is more punishment in America because the pool of criminals
has an unambiguously higher level of meanness in America. Equation (2) tells us that an
individual will commit a crime in America if and only if his meanness is above 19=10; whereas
in France he will commit a crime if and only if his meanness is larger than 1: This is the
driving force behind most of our results. Note nally, that one can increase punishment in
America (more than in France) by choosing q functions that place more weight on the right
tail of the distribution of : This simple mechanism will also be feasible for the more general
model.
We now return to the more general model described in Section 3, where we use high
powered contracts when the rm chooses a market technology. Although this adds some
complexity, it also more realistic and improves the explanatory power (as, for example,
income in the American equilibrium will be more unequally distributed than in France). For
evidence on this correlation between severity and inequality, see Section 2.
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5 Crime and Punishment
Let g be the distribution of types that will arise in equilibrium (the distribution that the
Government will presume for its calculations). We now describe the two types of equilibrium
that we are interested in, which will give rise to two possible equilibrium distributions g:
We are interested in two of the subgames that follow after rst stage play and before the
worker receives his taste shock 19 : those following play consistent with the American and
the French equilibria. We begin with a description of the game that follows after the French
equilibrium which is simpler.
5.1 France
In this subgame there are two players, the worker and the Government, who must choose
actions simultaneously. The action space for the worker is C = [min; max]: he must choose
a cuto¤ c. The interpretation of the cuto¤ is that the worker will commit a crime i¤   c:
The analysis in the preceding section showed that for a given u; the optimal cuto¤ is c (t) =
uM   u; but in principle, the worker can choose any cuto¤ he desires. The action space for
the Government is T = [ M;M ] for some (large) M : it must choose a time in jail t for the
criminals.
The workers expected utility for a strategy prole (c; t), given that  has a density f , is
w (c; t) =
Z c
min
uMf () d+
Z max
c
(u (t) + ) f () d:
The rst term is the payo¤ when  is small and induces the worker to stay in the legal
market; the second corresponds to meanness levels that induce crime. As was noted before,
this payo¤ is maximized at c (t) = uM   u (t) :
Any given choice of cuto¤ c; not necessarily the optimal cuto¤, generates a certain crim-
inal behavior. Conditional on having caught a criminal, and that the worker had chosen
cuto¤ c; the Government has a posterior belief about the types of the criminal which is given
by
Pr ( j crime) = Pr (cr j ) f ()
Pr (crime)
=
Pr (cr j ) f ()
1  F (c) = g
c () =
(
0  < c
f()
1 F (c)   c
: (4)
To ensure continuity of the posterior beliefs we assume (Bayes does not apply) that for
c = max; the Government is certain that  = max:
19Technically the subgame that follows after play of High e¤ort-Market technology is not a subgame
since in the second stage the government does not know whether the worker it faces was lucky or unlucky in
the rst stage. But we now analyze this second stage as a Bayesian game as ifthere had not been a rst
stage, but rather that the game starts by a move of nature that chooses uH or uL:
15
For any prole of strategies (c; t) the Governments utility is
G (c; t) =  
Z
(q ()  t)2 gc () d:
Then, the Governments best response to a choice of c by the worker is to set
t (c) = Egc (q) =
Z
q () gc () d:
Here we have implicitly assumed thatM is large enough that M  q (min) < q (max) M;
so that the optimal t is feasible.20
The next Lemma shows one of the insights that drives many of the results in this paper:
when the worker increases his cuto¤, the averagetype of criminal is worse (using q and the
posterior) since the best types that were formerly committing crimes are no longer criminals;
this leads to a higher choice of punishment by the Government.
Lemma 1 In the subgame following play of No E¤ort by the worker and Bureaucracy by the
rm, the Governments best response function t is increasing in c:
Proof. Since q is increasing it will su¢ ce to show that the c.d.f. of gc0 rst order
stochastically dominates gc for c0 > c :Z x
gc () d =
Z x
c
f ()
1  F (c)d =
F (x)  F (c)
1  F (c) 
F (x)  F (c0)
1  F (c0) =
Z x
gc
0
() d
as was to be shown.
In a similar vein, we already know from c (t) = uM   u (t) that an increase in the
punishment level by the Government leads to a higher cuto¤ and hence to less crime by
criminals that are worse on average, than before the increase in t:
Before turning to the comparative statics of the equilibrium levels of c and t with respect
to the exogenous parameters, we now show that an equilibrium exists.
Proposition 1 In the subgame following play of No E¤ort by the worker and Bureaucracy
by the rm, there always exists an equilibrium.
Proof. Continuity of the utility functions of the players follows from continuity of u and
the fact that f is a density, ensuring continuity of its posterior gc: The strategy spaces are
compact, so one only needs to check quasiconcavity of the utility functions in each players
20We could have assumed that the strategy space of the Government was all of R; and the Government
would still choose punishments in the [q (min) ; q (max)] range. We have chosen a compact strategy space
so that existence of an equilibrium can be easily checked from the primitives of the model.
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own strategy. The derivative of w (c; t) with respect to c is [uM   u (t)  c] f (c) which is
positive for small values of c and then negative, establishing quasiconcavity. Then, the
derivative of G (c; t) with respect to t is
R
2 (q ()  t) gc () d which is positive and then
negative, establishing quasiconcavity.
With the assumptions we have made, there may be multiple equilibria: one with high
levels of punishment and low crime and one with a lenient Government and high crime. This
multiplicity does not a¤ect our analysis and hence we will not make assumptions to ensure
uniqueness.
We now turn to the comparative statics on uM : how do the equilibrium values of c
and t change when uM changes? The next proposition shows that, if the equilibrium values
of (c (uM) ; t (uM)) are continuous in uM (a reasonable property of any equilibrium selection
criterion and trivially satised when there is a unique equilibrium), either: they are increasing
in uM or the equilibrium is unstable.21 The formal notion of stability in the following
Proposition is best case stabilityof Echenique (2002).
Proposition 2 In the subgame following play of No E¤ort by the worker and Bureaucracy
by the rm, if the equilibrium values of c and t; as a function of uM are continuous, they are
either increasing or unstable. Moreover, there are increasing equilibrium selections.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
The result is consistent with the positive correlation between Severity and GDP per
capita presented in Section 2.
5.2 America
Take a rst stage play in which the individual exerts e¤ort in his market activity and the
rm chooses the market technology. Before receiving the taste shock, there will be two types
of individuals: a proportion p who had a bright future because they had earned uH  buH e
and a proportion 1   p who had a bleak future because they had earned uL  buL   e: The
strategy of the worker is therefore a choice of two cuto¤s (cL; cH) ; such that: a type who
had earned uH (a type H worker) will commit a crime if and only if   cH ; a type who
21The equilibrium is unstable in the sense that, starting in a value of uM such that a slight increase
in uM does not increase (c (uM ) ; t (uM )) ; it happens that the following reasoning would take you to an
equilibrium with higher values of c and t (contrary to what the equilibrium selector requires): an increase
in uM makes the worker increase his cuto¤ for the xed (old) equilibrium t (uM ) ; given this change in the
cuto¤, it is optimal for the Government to increase its punishment level (by Lemma 1); given this increase
in punishment, it is optimal for the worker to increase his cuto¤; the process then continues with further
increases in c and t; leading to a new (larger) equilibrium.
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had earned uL (a type L) will commit a crime if   cL: The strategy space for the worker
is therefore S = f(cL; cH) : cL; cH 2 [min; max] and cL  cHg : The Government chooses a
(single) punishment level t, since it is not able to observe opportunitiesor the rst stage
income.
A type Hs utility of a cuto¤ cH when the Government chooses t; is
w (c; t;H) =
Z cH
min
uHf () d+
Z max
cH
(u (t) + ) f () d:
Similarly, a type Ls utility of a cuto¤ cL when the Government chooses t; is
w (c; t;L) =
Z cL
min
uLf () d+
Z max
cL
(u (t) + ) f () d:
The best responses are given by
[cL (t) ; c

H (t)] = [uL   u (t) ; uH   u (t)] : (5)
The driving force behind the results in this paper, is that the Government has the same utility
function as in the subgame following the French equilibrium, v (t; ) =   (q ()  t)2 ; but the
pool of criminals it faces is di¤erent than in France and that this asymmetry was generated
by the economic market outcomes. Therefore, in order to calculate the punishments by the
Government, we now turn to the calculation of the Governments posterior beliefs about ,
conditional on the fact that the individual is a criminal, and that the worker had chosen
a pair of cuto¤s (cL; cH) : After having caught an individual who committed a crime, the
probability that he was lucky, H; in the job market is
P (H j crime) = P (H & crime)
P (crime)
=
P (crime j H)P (H)
P (crime j H)P (H) + P (crime j L)P (L)
=
[1  F (cH)] p
[1  F (cH)] p+ (1  F (cL)) (1  p)
The complement is the probability that the individual was unlucky, L; given that he com-
mitted a crime:
P (L j crime) = [1  F (cL)] (1  p)
[1  F (cL)] (1  p) + [1  F (cH)] p:
For c = (cL; cH) ; and letting fx denote the function f on   x; and 0 otherwise we then
have
gc () = P (H j crime) f ( j  > cH) + P (L j crime) f ( j  > cL)
= P (H j crime) fcH ()
1  F (cH) + P (L j crime)
fcL ()
1  F (cL)
=
fcH () p+ fcL () (1  p)
1  pF (cH)  (1  p)F (cL) =
(
(1 p)f()
1 pF (cH) (1 p)F (cL) cL   < cH
f()
1 pF (cH) (1 p)F (cL)   cH
(6)
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In order to see how our results will work, we now compare the conditional densities of
types for cL < cM < cH . We will later show that this choice of cuto¤s is consistent with
equilibrium choices of France and America. Notice that if F (cM) < pF (cH)+(1  p)F (cL) ;
then the comparison of equation 6 with the conditional density in the French equilibrium
gcM () =
(
0  < cM
f()
1 F (cM )   cM
shows that the proportion of types larger than cH ; the really mean individuals, is larger
in America than in France. The conditional density in America is such that there will be
no criminal types below cL; some types between cL and cH ; and a lot of types larger
than cH : This higher proportion of mean individuals in America will then result in higher
punishments.
The next Lemma presents the Governments best response to a workers choice of criminal
behavior given by c = (cL; cH).
Lemma 2 Let c = (cL; cH) be a strategy choice by the worker, and let gc be given by equation
6. The optimal punishment for belief gc is t (c; p) = Egc (q ()) or equivalently
t (c; p) =
cHZ
cL
(1  p) f () q ()
1  pF (cH)  (1  p)F (cL)d+
maxZ
cH
f () q ()
1  pF (cH)  (1  p)F (cL)d: (7)
Proof. The rst order condition for the maximization problem of the Government isZ
@v (t; )
@t
gc () d =
Z
2 (q ()  t) gc () d = 0, t (c; p) = Egc (q ()) :
In order to illustrate how the model works, we now present a Lemma that will also be
useful in the comparative statics that follow in the next section. It says that:
 an increase in cL increases the Governments optimal punishment. The reason is that
when cL increases, the lowest types of  that were committing crimes are no longer in
the pool of criminals, and therefore the average(according to q and gc) criminal has
worsened, deserving a higher level of punishment.
 an increase in p increases the Governments optimal punishment. As p increases, the
likelihood (as measured by gc) that an individual was lucky (an H type with utility
uH ; with a higher cuto¤ cH  cL) in the rst period increases, and since the pool
of lucky criminals is worse than the pool of unlucky criminals, the Government sets
higher punishments.
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Lemma 3 The optimal punishment of the Government is increasing in cL and in p and
ambiguous in cH :
Proof. See Appendix 3.
The proof of this result is based on the fact that both increases, in p and in cL; cause a rst
order stochastic dominance increase in gc (an upward movement) and since q is increasing,
its expected value increases.
Finally, we note that in this subgame an equilibrium always exists.
Proposition 3 In the subgame following play of High E¤ort by the worker and Market
Technology by the rm, there always exists an equilibrium.
Proof. Given our assumptions, the aggregate best responseB (c; t) = [[cL (t) ; c

H (t)] ; t
 (c)]
is a continuous function in a convex and compact subset of the R3; so that by Brouwers
theorem, it has a xed point, which is an equilibrium.
6 Main Results
We now show the main result of this paper. It states that there exists a density f; and a
distaste for bad types q and a utility function u such that the American equilibrium leads to
harsher punishments than the French equilibrium. Moreover, for any f 0; q0 and u0 close to
f; q and u America still has harsher punishments. The parameters in the Proposition were
chosen to match a GDP per capita that is 50% larger in the US (GDP per capita adjusted
by Purchasing Power Parity is 40% larger in the US) and a poverty rate in the US of around
12% (we have chosen 10%).
Proposition 4 Let u (t) = 2  t, q () = 4
3
 and let f be uniform on [ 2; 2]. With uM = 1,
p = 90%; r = 0%; uL = 1=2; uH = 3=2: crime is higher in France than in America,
and punishment is higher in America than in France (tA > tF ). Moreover, for any set
of parameters and functions which are close to these, we also get the same cross country
comparative statics.
Proof. See Appendix 3.
In Proposition 4 we have shown that there exists a set of parameters for which the
equilibrium in America yields higher (lower) punishment rates (crime rates) than in France.
First, it must be claried that the result that higher penalties result in lower crime is not
trivial in this model, since the economic outcomes of the two countries are di¤erent. Second,
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note that although Proposition 4 shows the possibility of higher crime and less punishment in
France, slight variations of the model can accommodate higher punishment and higher crime
in the US. See, in particular Section 7. The reason we have chosen to include the former
conguration is that Table 1 shows that in the mid nineties crime rates were comparable
accross the Atlantic, and they have fallen dramatically over the past decade in America.
Moreover, in Appendix 1 we show a related model where the American equilibrium with
harsher punishment can involve higher or lower levels of crime.
We can summarize how the Proposition works.
 There are two identical countries, which di¤er only in their beliefs: in America, workers
believe e¤ort pays and rms believe workers will exert e¤ort; in France, workers believe
e¤ort doesnt pay and rms believe workers wont exert e¤ort.
 Americans exert E¤ort, and the French dont;
 After trying out work, individuals must choose whether to stay in the labour market
and collect their wages or desist and enter a life in crime. This choice depends on their
income, the realization of their meannessshock and the punishment they would face
in the crime market;
 In America some good individuals who were unlucky in the labour market commit
crimes. Within the group of lucky workers, only the very mean commit crimes. In
France, individuals with moderate levels of meanness commit crimes (the kindest
French criminal is worse than the kindest American criminal).
 The Government punishes individuals taking the equilibrium into account, and deliv-
ering more punishment if the expected meannessis higher. This will result in some
good but unlucky (poor) individuals also getting harsh punishment in America, but if
e¤ort really pays, these are small in number. See also the extension in the Appendix
where individuals have types and some dont exert e¤ort.
We now turn to an analysis of the comparative statics of the equilibrium values of the
cuto¤s and punishment in the American equilibrium when p and uL change (there isnt
much that can be said about changes in uH). In order to do so, we dene the composed best
response function B (t; p; uL; uH), a function of t parametrized by p, uL and uH ; through
B (t; p; uL; uH) = t
 (c (t;uL; uH) ; p)
where t (c; p) is dened by equation (7) and c (t;uL; uH) = [cL (t;uL) ; c

H (t;uH)] is dened
by equation (5).
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The equilibria of the game following play of the American equilibrium in the rst stage
can be found by solving B (t; p; uL; uH) = t: Then, the equilibrium values of c and t are a
function of the exogenous parameters p; uL and uH :
We begin with the comparative statics on p: This analysis will answer the question how
do equilibrium crime and punishment change when it is more true that `e¤ort pays?A
similar way of interpreting the result is what happens when there is a smaller gap between
the American dreamand reality?22 Another, more subtle interpretation of the comparative
statics is the following. Note that the only way in which B depends on p is through its e¤ect
on t (; p) : If instead of interpreting p as the actual probability of high output in the rst
period (conditional on having exerted e¤ort) we interpret p as the belief that the Government
has about the probability of high output (which could be wrong, and for example higher than
the true ep) the comparative static result that follows would answer the question how do
the equilibrium crime and punishment change when the Government is run by a party that
is more convinced that `e¤ort pays?
The result establishes that as people become more convinced that e¤ort pays, pun-
ishment becomes harsher, and crime decreases in the American equilibrium. In this game
strategies are not complements, and so one can not apply the techniques of Echenique (2002)
to ensure that stable equilibria have the rightcomparative statics properties (as we did in
Proposition 2). With the assumptions made so far, one can only make comparative statics
assertions about the largest and smallest equilibria (or about the odd equilibria generically).
Therefore, for the following comparative statics results, we will assume that one of these
equilibria is selected.
Proposition 5 In the American equilibrium, when p increases, the equilibrium punishment
increases and the cuto¤s increase, resulting in less crime.
Proof. We will show that B (t; p; uL; uH) is continuous in t and increasing in p; and then
apply Corollary 1 in Milgrom and Roberts (1994). Continuity follows from: the continuity
of (uL   u (t) ; uH   u (t)) in u (t) ; the continuity of u (t) in t; and the continuity of t (c; p)
when the distribution of types  has a density (as we have assumed). To show that B is
increasing in p; notice that when p increases, for a xed t; c (t;uL; uH) is unchanged. Then,
for any xed pair of cuto¤s (cL; cH) (in this case, a xed c (t;uL; uH)) of the worker, the
increase in p causes an increase (in rst order stochastic dominance sense) of the posterior
belief in the Governments posterior and therefore in the Governments optimal punishment
t (c (t;uL; uH) ; p) as was shown in Lemma 3.
22As noted above, moving p changes average income in America but it still does not mean that we are
assuming a di¤erence between the two countries because the choice of a risky technology was available to
the French at the start. The French did not choose it because they did not think that e¤ort paid.
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The proof of Proposition 5 is illustrated in the following picture, an adaptation of Figure
2 in Milgrom and Roberts (1994). The key for establishing our comparative statics results
was showing that B (t; p) is increasing in p: In particular, an increase in p keeps the workers
optimal strategy xed (for xed t) and makes the Government increase its optimal punish-
ment (see Lemma 3). As was argued before, the equilibria of this game are those in which
B (t; p) = t in the picture:
t
t
B(t,p)
B(t,p')
e
e'
E
E'
For p0 > p; when B (t; p0) > B (t; p) ; we get that the smallest equilibrium e moves to the
right to e0; and similarly for E; the largest equilibrium.
Two more remarks are in order. First, as was pointed out above, our model can be
interpreted as a reduced form of a principal agent model. In a in a full edged principal-
agent model the comparative statics with respect to p would be more involved, since a
change in p would typically change the optimal uH and uL chosen by the rm. A second,
more interesting, observation is that if one interprets the change in p not as a real change in
the technology, but rather as a change in the perception of the Government about whether
e¤ort pays (say, a more right wing Government), then Proposition 5 ensures that punishment
becomes harsher.
What is the e¤ect of an increase in the wages of the poor in the American equilibrium?
The next Proposition shows that it increases equilibrium punishment and reduces crime.
The intuition is that any given criminal is more likely to be a worse type, since there are less
poor criminals and on average poor criminals have a lower meanness level :
Proposition 6 In the American equilibrium, when uL increases, the equilibrium punishment
increases and the cuto¤s increase, resulting in less crime.
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Proof. See Appendix 3.
The proof of Proposition 6 is similar to that of Proposition 5. This result is related
to a strand of the economic literature that has analyzed the link between redistribution of
wealth and crime. In particular, Eaton and White (1991) have shown that in an economy
with crime, redistribution of wealth can lead to Pareto improvements. Also, Benoît and
Osborne (1995) have considered the interaction of redistributive policies and punishment in
the reduction of crime.
7 Discussion
Retribution and Deterrence as Motivation for Punishment: In this paper we have assumed
that retribution is the basis for punishment, although we note that similar results obtain if
we focus on deterrence. First, and beyond the three advantages listed in the introduction,
we note that retribution has long historical roots, associated with the phrase an eye for an
eye, a tooth for a toothand is the basis for one of the earliest sets of laws found, the Code of
Hammurabi. Second, there is some experimental evidence that individuals are motivated by
retribution concerns (over deterrence) when choosing punishment. For example, Carlsmith
et al (2002) ask respondents to read a short vignette describing a theft and the eventual
apprehension of the criminal. They then ask the respondent for a sentence recommendation.
The authors show that when the original vignette is altered so that the probability of catching
the thief changes from almost impossible to detectto very easy to detect, the sentencing
recommendation does not change, contrary to what deterrence suggests (since deterrence is
concerned with the ex-ante utility of committing a crime). They then change the vignette by
varying the motivation of the thief (so as to change the perceived meanness of the individual).
In one case he wanted money to redistribute to poorer people and in another he needed it
for cancelling betting debts. The authors found that the betting manipulation increased
sentencing signicantly.
Third, there are some philosophical discussions rejecting the morality of non-retributive
punishment following the work of Immanuel Kant (1952), who argued that punishment
can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another goodand should be
pronounced over all criminals proportionate to their internal wickedness(cited in Carlsmith
et al, 2002). Furthermore, it has become the dominant theory of punishment as noted in
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
A generation ago sociologists, criminologists, and penologists became dis-
enchanted with the rehabilitative e¤ects (as measured by reductions in o¤ender
recidivism) of programs conducted in prisons aimed at this end (Martinson 1974).
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This disenchantment led to skepticism about the feasibility of the very aim of
rehabilitation within the framework of existing penal philosophy. To these were
added skepticism over the deterrent e¤ects of punishment (whether special, aimed
at the o¤ender, or general, aimed at the public) and as an e¤ective goal to pursue
in punishment.
Finally, it has become explicitly the basis for some of the observed moves towards harsher
punishment in America. For example, California has been the most explicit in embracing the
retributive justice model. In 1976, Governor Jerry Brown signed the Determinate Sentencing
Law, which made retribution the sole objective of the states sentencing system with The
Legislature nds and declares that the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment.
(California Penal Code 1170).
In order to interpret our model when the motivation for punishment is deterrence (instead
of retribution) we must change the interpretation of the individual shock  from meanness
to pessimism. In that case a judge facing a criminal is in front of a person who decided
that his/her legal opportunities where so bad that they were seduced by a criminal life. In
America there are two types. Those that faced a good initial output shock (in the proportion
p) but a particularly severe pessimism shock and those that were unlucky (1   p of them)
that where on average less pessimistic than the previous group (but the low initial income
veered them towards the crime decision).
Finally, our model is designed for identical societies. Of course, a feature of criminal
activity is its high correlation with ethnic segregation, which is higher in America. The
ideas presented in the model can easily be extended to a setting where there are groups with
di¤erent (real or perceived) net returns to education. These di¤erences could arise because
of a higher cost of getting educated or because of expected discrimination once in the labor
market. In Appendix 1 we present such a model, where criminals in the end are punished
because they are perceived to be both mean and lazy. Criminals are again harshly punished
in America because they had opportunities which they failed to take. Given the structure of
the model, the crime rates are indeterminate: crime could be higher in France or America,
depending on the parameters.
Beliefs: We model the idea that e¤ort pays through the parameter p (and the parameter
r). This means that belief in e¤ort pays in our model captures two slightly di¤erent
conceptions. First, it suggests that if the rm chooses market technology, then e¤ort (for
the worker) pays more than being lazy. This belief is conrmed in equilibrium. This follows
the idea of a Nash equilibrium, so it really is a belief in the sense that if worker thinks
that the rm plays Market, then the worker holds the belief that e¤ort pays, which gets
conrmed in equilibrium. And second, the bigger is p, the more true it is that e¤ort pays.
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This is the traditional notion in economics of a distribution of probabilities over an unknown
parameter p (the distribution is degenerate in that we know with probability 1 the true
value of p).23 Note that in the American equilibrium, everyone is exerting high levels of
e¤ort and a relatively large part of the population is doing well in economic terms (p > r).
Individuals also understand that everyone believes that e¤ort pays because they can observe
the majority of the population doing well (otherwise there would only be r rich) and high
powered contracts are being o¤ered. Thus, beliefs get fully conrmed in equilibrium.
It is worth emphasizing that we have chosen to allow for the income process (which
determines whether e¤ort pays) to be fully determined by the institutional choices of society.
This is compatible with Webers view of instituons, Denzau and Norths (1994) discussion
of shared mental models, and the models where reality is socially constructedof Ruggie
(1998) and Searle (2005). More importantly, there is no demand for new information, and
there is no convergence of beliefs across the Atlantic as in each place beliefs get fully conrmed
in equlibrium. Even if by mistake a person wanted to change e¤ort levels and see if their
belief in the value of p is justied, such experimentation would require the cooperation of
another party (i.e., it would require coordination between the rm and the worker). Contrast
this with previous results by Piketty (1995), which is a single agent decision problem. There,
failure to experiment results from the natural trade-o¤between exploration (looking for more
information) and exploitation (selecting the choice that is believed to provide the highest
payo¤). Di¤erences in initial beliefs lead Europe and America to di¤erent steady states. Note
that full convergence on the truthis prevented by assuming an inability to observe other
peoples choices -the aggregate choices in the political market or the individual choices in the
labor and crime market. A di¤erent approach is taken by Benabou and Tirole (2006), where
a persistent desire of individuals to avoid or distort new information to correct a willpower
problem results in lack of convergence on the truth. In contrast, multiplicity survives in
the model of Alesina and Angeletos (2005), even when beliefs are unbiased, as long as the
volatility of income derived from fairsources (savings and e¤ort) is more sensitive to taxes
than the volatility of income due to luck.24
23It may be confusing that the unknown parameter p is also a probability. In this case, note that when we
increase p, we can say that beliefs change (it is more true that e¤ort pays) because the parameter increases
although it would be better to say that both the truth (the true p) and beliefs about the truth have shifted
towards the right (i.e., more weight on bigger values of p). We considered focusing on the di¤erence between
uH and uL as an alternative way to model changes in belief in e¤ort pays. However, this seemed unattractive
in this model because, in a full edged principal agent contract these values would be set by the rm and
would be determined with knowledge of how punishment a¤ects the workers outside opportunities.
24Alesina and Angeletos (2004) presents a model which yields precisely those features. In it, the unfair
income is derived from corruption and rent seeking, and higher taxes result in more rent seeking. Bowles and
Gintis (1976) argue that economic status is passed on to children in part by means of unequal educational
opportunity, but that the economic advantages of the o¤spring of higher social status families go beyond the
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Crime Rates Across the Atlantic: In our model, higher punishment in America obtains
because there is a lower crime rate. This relationship was consistent with the empirical
evidence in some crime categories in 1994, as noted in Table 1, and has become the norm
for most crime categories (except homicides): Tonry (1998) emphasizes both lower crime
rates in the US and declinig more rapidly; Levitt (2004) emphasizes the big decline on all
crime rates in the US during the 1990s. There are, however, three natural extensions of
our model that could accomodate a prediction of harsher punishment in America even if
crime rates exceed those observed in Europe. First, crime rates in America are the product
of both black and white criminals. The majority of the incarcerated population is black,
suggesting that it is possible that the white crime rate in the US is lower than the overall
crime rate in Europe. In this case our theory would explain white crime and punishment
in the American dream. Although this would imply potentially di¤erent theories for the
determination of crime and punishment for whites and blacks, it could encompass the fact
that there seems to be discrimination against blacks both in the economic market and in the
sentencing procedures.
Second, it is possible to argue that beliefs in e¤ort pays are more prevalent than they
should in America. Benabou and Tirole (2006) cite evidence of similar mobility levels in
Europe and America, while Americans believe that mobility is large. One can use this
di¤erence to obtain a high crime rate (determined by a relatively low p) and high punishment
(determined by a high perception of what p is, as in Proposition 5) in America. That is,
high punishment is linked to perceptions of high mobility and perceived rewards to e¤ort,
while high crime rates would follow from the reality of limited opportunities.
Finally, in our model everyone that is willing to commit a crime nds an opportunity
to become a criminal and commits a crime. This is for simplicity, as it is more logical to
assume that the process generating the arrival of crime opportunities is not the same as
crime disposition. In a richer model where crime opportunities arrive (exogenously) to only
a fraction of potential criminals, the average type in the pool of criminals in America is
meaner than in Europe (because when p increases only mean criminals are availablein the
US) but crime rates are determined by some supplyprocess that we have not modeled.
Link to Merton (1938): In an inuential paper, Merton (1938) argued that high crime
rates in America were a result of the psychological stress created by the gap between a
reality of limited opportunities and a generalized belief in the American dream. However,
Merton and subsequent research has not dealt with the problem of why punishment is so
severe if such a mitigating circumstance is present. See Agnew (1999), Rosenfeld and Messner
(2001), inter alia, as well as the review by Cullen and Agnew (2003) and the references cited
superior education they receive.
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therein.25 In our model, some individuals also fail to achieve the cultural goal of success
and commit crimes, although in our case this is a result of luck rather than discrimination.
In our model, the prevalence of belief in the American dreaminduces a society to choose
high powered incentive contracts which means that a subgroup of individuals will be poor
(the unlucky). Some of them will commit crimes even though they have similar meanness
than some rich non-crimnals. It is possible to argue that the unlucky are subject to strain
because the fact that they are more likely to commit crimes is a direct result of the prevalence
of the American dream, although it should be emphasized that we are not modelling a
psychological e¤ect that increases the predisposition to commit crimes in America.
8 Conclusion
A striking aspect of American social and economic organization is the harsh treatment of
criminals. As Tonry (1998) describes them, Contemporary policies concerning crime and
punishment are the harshest in American history and of any western country. The objective
of this paper is to provide a theory where both crime and punishment as well as other features
of the economic system (such as the role of incentives) are determined simultaneously in a
way that t the observed empirical patterns. In other words, we seek to incorporate crime
and punishment into an economic theory of American exceptionalism.
As in recent work in this area, our theory gives a leading role to beliefs in the American
dream. Two otherwise identical societies start out with di¤erent degrees of belief about
the impact of luck -rather than e¤ort- in the determination of income. Two equilibria can
emerge. In one society, beliefs in the American dreamprevail, rms o¤er high powered
incentive contracts and workers exert e¤ort. In the second society, people tend to believe
that income is independent of e¤ort, at contracts prevail and workers choose low e¤ort. In
our model, this occurs because of a complementarity in production whereby it does not pay
for rms to o¤er a di¤erent type of contract given individual beliefs. Some workers become
criminals, depending on their luck in the labor market, an individual shock that we call
meannessand the expected punishment. Our main result is that punishment for criminals
is harsher in the Americanequilibrium than in the Frenchequilibrium. There are two
reasons for this, depending on the theory of punishment that prevails. When punishment is
set for retributionreasons (as in common in the criminology literature and in practice),
punishment is harsh in the American dreambecause when e¤ort pays only truly mean
people would prefer to become criminals. When punishment is set for deterrencereasons
25Merton (1938) also predicts that higher crime will prevail in such societies because of the strong emphasis
on success and a relatively weak emphasis on obtaining it through legitimate means. Such societies are
characterized by a state of anomieor normlessness. See Cullen and Agnew (2003) for a description.
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(as is common in economic models), harsh punishment corrects (ex ante) the tendency to
commit crimes of the pessimists, which are over represented in the criminal population in
the equilibrium with high powered contracts (relative to France).
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9 Appendix 1: Foregone opportunities in a theory of
punishment.
In this model we have made the Government a non-strategic player, in order to simplify the
analysis and focus on a di¤erent set of issues. Therefore, the timing of the Governments
setting of the punishment is irrelevant, but for descriptive purposes we kept the same timing
of the movements: in the last period of this economic system, the Government chooses a
punishment for individuals and individuals simultaneously choose whether to commit crimes.
There are two types of people: bums and active, with types b < a: The proportion of
a is p: In the rst period of the model, workers play a signalling game by choosing e¤ort, or
education. In the second period of the model, after they have completed their education, the
rm sets a wage schedule that pays workers according to the expected value of what they
are worth.26 Thus, in a separating equilibrium in which the types choose (ea; eb) the rm
pays the worker according to his type, if known, and education level:
Once the education level has been chosen and the rm has set its wage schedule, in and
the third period the worker has two choices:
 home production and obtain h (i; ei);
 work and obtain the (equilibrium) wage, with the option of becoming a criminal. Once
the worker has entered the rm, he observes his taste shock ; a meanness level, and
then decides whether to enter the crime market. This timing has two justications: the
rst is simplicity, in order to avoid the lemons problem that would arise for the rm
if the taste shock was observed before entering; the second is that in order to decide
whether to commit a crime or stay in the market, the worker mustknow whether he
likes the job or not. With this in mind, the taste shock is a taste for crime relative to
that of working.
It will then happen that mean guys leave the job; honest guys dont (but their wage is
xed by law, so the rm cant re-optimize and o¤er the good guys a lower wage). When
an individual goes to the crime market, he obtains: b +    e=i if the crime is successful,
where b is the bounty and  e=i is the (sunk) cost of education; 0 +   e=i   t if caught,
where t is time in jail. The taste shock  can take only two values m and M > m:
In the third and last period a type k = a; b that works in a rm, and attained education
level ej generates an income for the rm given by I(k; ej). The worker has a utility function
u: The reservation utility is the maximum of h (i; ei) and u = f (b; ; t; q) the utility of
26This can be the result of competition by rms, or by setting a utility function similar to that of the
Government in the model in Section 3.
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crime (which depends on the bounty b, the moral shock , the time in jail specied by the
Government t; and the probability of being caught q). As was argued before, we model the
Government as setting u in this last period, but in a non strategic manner (i.e. we dont
specify its action space, or its utility function).
We then have the following structure. In the rst period each type of worker chooses
his education level (the payo¤ to his education will depend on the choice of wages and
punishment in the second and third stages). In the second period the rm sets its wages
optimally, which results in wages for workers equal to their worth. In the third period,
the worker and Government simultaneously make their choices: the Government chooses
punishment and probability of catching, and the worker chooses whether to work, home
produce or commit crimes.
We will study two types of equilibria. In the American equilibrium, in the rst period
there is a separating equilibrium and then Bums with moral shock M commit crimes. In
the French equilibrium, in the rst period there is a pooling equilibrium and then (some)
individuals with moral cost M commit crimes.
We will now solve the model, starting with the French equilibrium.
9.1 French Equilibrium
The French equilibrium is as follows: there is a pooling equilibrium (of all the possible
pooling equilibria, we assume that it is one with a relatively low level of e¤ort-education,
so that the value of home production is not larger than the reservation utility of crime that
the Government will choose in the last stage, uF ; for b types who studied ep); all or some M
types choose crime while the rest choose to work.
Here e¤ort doesnt pay because even if you study (more than ep) you wont get paid
more.
In the last stage, consistent with what will happen in that same stage, and in previous
ones, the Government chooses a relatively high uF : At the same time, all or some M types
choose crime while the rest choose to work. In the second stage, the rm must pay (in
equilibrium) more than the workers would get by engaging in home production (with the
education level they chose in the previous period) and more than they would get in the crime
market. The condition for an equilibrium is therefore that wages sF are set so that workers
are indi¤erent between working and crime (we have assumed a low ep)
u
 
sF

= uF  h (a; ep)  h (b; ep)
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9.1.1 Signalling in the rst stage
In the rst stage, we x beliefs for the rm that are: for e = ep; the rm believes that the
individual is competent (active, a) with probability p, and for e 6= ep the rm believes that
the individual is competent with probability 0: In that case, we assume that the rm wants
to o¤er a wage of 0, so the worker just gets his home production h (; e) (this could happen
if in order for the plant to work, you need some competent employees).
Let Ea and Eb be the optimal levels of education for home production: for k = a; b
Ek 2 argmax
e
h (k; e)  e
k
:
Given the beliefs, the worker must choose between ep and e = Ek; and it must be the
case that
u
 
sF
  ep
b
 h (b; Eb)  Eb
b
u
 
sF
  ep
a
 h (a; Ea)  Ea
a
:
9.2 American
The American equilibrium is as follows: the Government chooses a high punishment for
crime, resulting in a relatively low uA; in the rst period there is a separating equilibrium;
in the nal period a types choose to work, and the b types work if and only if the meanness
level m < M . Here e¤ort pays, because if you study, you get a high wage. The conditions for
an equilibrium are therefore the prot maximization conditions for the rm. Wages sA (ea)
are set so that workers are indi¤erent between working and home production, and sA (eb) so
that b is indi¤erent with crime
u
 
sAa

= h (a; ea)
u
 
sAb

= uA (8)
9.2.1 Signalling in the rst stage
In the rst stage, we x beliefs for the rm that are: for e = ea; the rm believes that the
individual is competent (active, A) with probability 1, and for e 6= ea the rm believes that
the individual is competent with probability 0: Given these beliefs, a worker of type b will
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choose e = 0: Wages must then satisfy (assuming uA  h (b; Eb)  Ebb )
u
 
sAa
  ea
a
 h (a; Ea)  Ea
a
ea better than best outside option
u
 
sAa
  ea
a
 u  sAb  ea better than best alternative in the rm (e = 0)
u
 
sAb

= uA eb = 0 indi¤erent with best outside option (eq. 8)
u
 
sAb
  u  sAa   eab eb = 0 better than only alternative which pays more than sAb
9.3 Morality
The bad guysB are those with a low distaste for crime, m; and that in previous stages
could have done something di¤erent to avoid falling in the crime market. The utility of
convicting these individuals with t years is uB (t) : Similarly, the utility for convicting any of
the rest, R; is uR (t). We assume a theory of punishment, which is based on retribution, but
incorporates concerns for the economic opportunities the individual had before becoming
a criminal and whether he tried to use them. A verbalization of our theory could be the
following: Since e¤ort pays, I want to punish harshly B types, and not just M types,
because if anM type works hard, he does not need to commit crimes.Mathematically, this
is
uB (t)  uR (t) is strictly increasing in t (9)
The intuitive illustration of why this is the verbalized theory of punishment is the following.
Imagine there is an R type in jail with a prison sentence of t > 0: Your utility of changing
an R type for a B type is uB (t)  uR (t) : This utility is larger for larger punishments.
We now show that with this theory of punishment, America has larger punishments than
France.
Let pB be the probability that a criminal you just caught is of type B; and pR = 1  pB
is the complement, the probability that a type is R: With these beliefs, you must choose t
to maximize
pBuB (t) + (1  pB)uR (t) :
In America, only B types commit crimes. In France no criminal had a chance, since in the
rst stage, they could have done nothing to avoid their current situation. So let us assume
that pAB > p
F
B:Without further assumptions, we have that the optimal punishments are such
that tA  tF : This is so, because since tA is optimal for pA and tF is optimal for pF ; we get
pABuB
 
tA

+
 
1  pAB

uR
 
tA
  pABuB  tF +  1  pABuR  tF 
pFBuB
 
tF

+
 
1  pFB

uR
 
tF
  pFBuB  tA+  1  pFBuR  tA
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which imply (subtracting the rhs of the second from the lhs of the rst, and the lhs of the
second from the rhs of the rst):
 
pAB   pFB
 
uB
 
tA
  uB  tF   uR  tA+ uR  tF   0
Since pAB > p
F
B; this means that
uB
 
tA
  uR  tA  uB  tF   uR  tF 
which holds i¤ tA  tF :
9.4 Existence
We now give a set of parameters for which the reader can check that all the conditions in
the previous section are satised. Set a = 2, b = 1; ea = Ea = 20; ep = 15; Eb = 0;
h (a; ea) = h (a; Ea) = h (a; ep) = 20; h (a; ep) = h (b; ep) = 15; h (b; Eb) = 10; u
F = 30;
uA = 10:
10 Appendix 2: Data
The set of countries for which we have both data on beliefs and on the severity of crime are,
England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, France,
Finland, Sweden, Portugal, Denmark, Spain (catalonia), US, Canada, Australia, Poland.
10.1 World Values Survey: Data Description and Variable Den-
itions
World Values Survey and European Values Survey (WVS-EVS, 1981-84, 1990-92, 1995-97)
The CombinedWorld Values Survey is produced by the Institute for Social Research, Ann
Arbor, MI, USA. The series is designed to enable a cross-national comparison of values and
norms on a wide variety of norms and to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the
globe. Both national random and quota sampling were used. All of the surveys were carried
out through face-to-face interviews, with a sampling universe consisting of all adult citizens,
aged 18 and older, across over 60 nations around the world. The 1981-83 survey covered
22 independent countries; the 1990-93 survey covered 42 independent countries; the 1995-
97 survey covered 53 independent countries. In total, 64 independent countries have been
surveyed in at least one wave of this investigation (counting East Germany as an independent
country, which it was when rst surveyed). These countries include almost 80 percent of the
worlds population. A fourth wave of surveys is being carried out in 1999-2000.
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Left Wing-L: is a categorical variable that is the answer to the question: In politics
people talk of the leftand of the right. In a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right,
where would you place yourself?. Dened so that higher numbers are more left wing.
Unfair for Poor-L: A dummy that is the response to the question: Why, in your opinion,
are there people in this country who live in need? Here are two opinions: which comes closest
to your view? (1) They are poor because of laziness and lack of willpower, or (2) They are
poor because society treats them unfairly.The dummy takes the value 1 if the answer is
(2) and 0 if the answer is (1).
No EscapeL: A dummy equal to 1 if the answer to the question: In your opinion, do
most poor people in this country have a chance of escaping from poverty, or there is very
little chance of escaping? (1) They have a chance or (2) There is very little chance.was
category (2) and 0 if it was category (1).
Government Help PoorL: The response to the World Values question: Do you think
that what the Government is doing for people in poverty in this country is about the right
amount, too much, or too little? (1) Too much, (2) About the right amount, or (3) Too
little.. Government help PoorL is a categorical variable equal 1 if the answer is (1), 2 if
the answer is (2) and 3 if the answer is (3).
Business Ownership-L: The response to the World Values question: There is a lot of dis-
cussion about how business and industry should be managed. Which of these four statements
comes closest to your opinion? (1) The owners should run their business or appoint the man-
agers, (2) The owners and the employees should participate in the selection of managers, (3)
The Government should be the owner and appoint the managers, (4) The employees should
own the business and elect the managers. Business Ownership-L was dened as a dummy
equals 1 if the answer is category (3) or (4) and 0 if the answer is category (1) or (2).
10.2 International Crime Victimization Survey: Data Description
and Variable Denitions
The International Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) series was developed by the ICVS inter-
national working group. Overall funding was provided by the Ministry of Justice of the
Netherlands. The project was set up to ll the gap in adequate recording of o¤enses by
the police for purposes of comparing crime rates in di¤erent nations and to provide a crime
index independent of police statistics as an alternative standardized measure. The Interna-
tional Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) is a far-reaching program of fully standardized surveys
investigating householdersexperience of crime in di¤erent countries. The data were col-
lected in four waves: 1989, 1992, 1996, and 2000. The main focus of the ICVS is whether
the respondent was a victim of theft of or from vehicles, other thefts, vandalism, robbery,
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pickpocketing, sexual harassment or violence, or assault. The surveys also investigated the
frequency of victimization, reasons for not reporting a crime to the police, familiarity with
the o¤ender in the case of a sexual o¤ense, physical violence, injuries, fear of crime in the
respondents local area, use of help agencies for victims, satisfaction with police behavior,
preferred legal sanctions, punishment, and length of detention for o¤enders, safety precau-
tions when leaving home, possession of a gun, burglar alarm, or insurance, and frequency of
going out. Some of the 2000 surveys were administered nationally and some were restricted
to a main city within a given country.
Severity 1-R: The response to the Crime Victimization question: People have di¤erent
ideas about the sentences which should be given to o¤enders. Take for instance the case of
a man of 20 years old who is found guilty of burglary for the second time. This time, he has
stolen a colour TV. Which of the following sentences do you consider the most appropriate
for such a case? (1) Fine, (2) Prison, (3) Community service, (4) Suspended sentence, (5)
Any other sentence. Severity 1 was dened as a categorical variable equals -1 if the answer
is category (1), 0 if the answer is category (3), (4) or (5), and 1 if the answer is category (2).
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11 Appendix 3: Proofs.
Proof of Proposition 2. The result that increasing equilibria exist follows from Corollary
1 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990) applied to t (c (t;uM)) : We now establish the instability
of continuous equilibrium selections that are not increasing. Lemma 1 showed that t (c)
is increasing, and from c (t;uM) = uM   u (t) we obtain that c (t;uM) is also increasing,
so that [c (t;uM) ; t (c)] is an increasing family of functions as required by Theorem 2 in
Echenique (2002) which then yields our desired result.
Proof of Lemma 3. We must show that the c.d.f. Gc of gc increases in rst order
stochastic dominance sense when p or cL increase. For p0 > p we have that
Gc (x; p) =
Z x
cL
f () (1  p)
1  pF (cH)  (1  p)F (cL)d+
Z x
cH
pf ()
1  pF (cH)  (1  p)F (cL)d(10)
=
(
(F (x) F (cL))(1 p)
1 F (cH)p F (cL)(1 p) x  cH
F (x) F (cH)p F (cL)(1 p)
1 pF (cH) (1 p)F (cL) x > cH
The derivative of Gc with respect to p is then
dGc (x; p)
dp
=
(
  (F (x) F (cL))(1 F (cH))
[1 pF (cH) (1 p)F (cL)]2  0 x  cH
(F (cL) F (cH))(1 F (x))
[1 pF (sH) (1 p)F (cL)]2  0 x > cH
We have therefore shown that for all x; Gc (x; p0)  Gc (x; p) for p0 > p; as was to be shown.
Now set c0L > cL and note that we get again a rst order stochastic increase in G
c :
dGc
dcL
=
(
f (cL) (1  p) F (x)(1 p)+F (cH)p 1[1 pF (cH) (1 p)F (cL)]2  0 x  cH
f(cL)(1 p)(F (x) 1)
[1 pF (cH) (1 p)F (cL)]2  0 x > cH
as was to be shown.
The ambiguity in the direction of movement of t when cH changes is a consequence of
the fact that for higher cH it will happen that for some densities f the posteriors for the two
levels of cH wont be ranked in rst order stochastic sense, and that implies that there will
be some qs for which the low level of cH yields higher punishment, and some qs for which
the high level of cH will yield higher punishments.
Proof of Proposition 4. America. Following choices of a market technology and
high e¤ort in the rst period, we have that
gA =
(
1 p
4 t puH (1 p)uL uH + t  2   > uL + t  2
1
4 t puH (1 p)uL 2   > uH + t  2
:
Then, using
EgA = P (  uH + t  2)E ( j   uH + t  2)+P ( > uH + t  2)E ( j  > uH + t  2)
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and the fact that the conditional expectations are the midpoints of the intervals, we get
3t
4
= EgA =
(1  p) (uH   uL)
4  t  puH   (1  p)uL

uH + uL
2
+ t  2

+
4  uH   t
4  t  puH   (1  p)uL
uH + t
2
:
The solution to the previous equation then yields the equilibrium punishment
tA =
4 + puH + (1  p)uL
2
(11)
 
q
 24 (puH + (1  p)uL) + 2puHuL + 9u2L + 8pu2H   10pu2L + p2 (uH   uL)2 + 16
2
Equilibrium, crime is then given by
1  pF (uH   u)  (1  p)F (uL   u) = 1  pF (uH + t  2)  (1  p)F (uL + t  2)(12)
=
4  t  puH   (1  p)uL
4
:
France. Punishment in France is given by the density in equation (4),
gF () = 1
4 uM t for   uM + t  2
so that the expected value of  is
EgF =
uM + t
2
, 3t
4
=
uM + t
2
, tF = 2uM : (13)
Crime in France will then be
Pr (  uM   u) = Pr (  uM + t  2) = 4  uM   t
4
=
4  3uM
4
: (14)
We will show that punishment is higher in America and crime higher in France. From
equations (11) and (13) we get tA = 2:26 > 2 = tF ; as was to be shown. Notice that this
implies sentencing standards 13% higher in the US. Moreover, from equations (12) and (14)
we see that crime in the US is 8% whereas in France it is 25%:
Finally, we must check that the two rst period equilibria are indeed equilibria. The
reason we must do this, is that playing high e¤ort does not yield an expected payo¤ of
uH   e; but rather, it depends on the second period choices between collecting the wages, or
going to the crime market. To accomplish this nal step we let the probability of high output,
with low e¤ort, in the market technology be 0; and let e; the cost of e¤ort, be arbitrarily
small
Suppose then that the rm chooses a market technology: The expected payo¤ for the
individual is then the combination of whether he will receive uH or uL; and what will happen
after observing  :
p

F (uH   u)uH +
Z 2
uH u
(u+ ) f () d

+(1  p)

F (uL   u)uL +
Z 2
uL u
(u+ ) f () d

:
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This equation becomes 1:4254; from the following calculation:
9
10
0BB@126  3
p
19
80
+
2Z
22 p19
10
 p
19  7
10
+ 
!
1
4
d
1CCA+ 110
0BB@32 
p
19
80
+
2Z
12 p19
10
 p
19  7
10
+ 
!
1
4
d
1CCA
Notice that the ex ante expected value is larger than 1:4; which is puH + (1  p)uL; given
that the individual can re-optimize after observing uH or uL: The uncertainty in the utility
of playing low e¤ort comes from the (unknown) value of . We then have that because the
probability of high output is 0 and because the cost of e¤ort is almost 0, the expected utility
of the worker of choosing low e¤ort when the rm chooses the market technology is
F (uL   u)uL+
Z 2
uL u
(u+ ) f () d =
32 p19
80
+
2Z
12 p19
10
 p
19  7
10
+ 
!
1
4
d = 0:69093:
(the large gap between 1.4254 and 0.69 shows that the probability of high output with low
e¤ort need not be 0; and that the cost of e¤ort need not be arbitrarily small). We conclude
that if the rm chooses the market technology it is better to choose high e¤ort.
Suppose now that the workers are choosing high e¤ort. Then, the rm must choose
between h and m; and we had assumed h > m; so indeed the American equilibrium is
an equilibrium.
We now check that the French equilibrium is an equilibrium. First notice that if the
workers are choosing low e¤ort, the rm would rather choose a bureaucratic technology,
because m > l: If the rm chooses a bureaucracy, for each value of  the individual is
better o¤ choosing low e¤ort, and for some values, strictly better o¤ because of the cost of
e¤ort. Hence, a bureaucracy with low e¤ort is also an equilibrium.
In order to see that parameters and functions close to the ones we have chosen also have
the property that tA > tF ; note that tA = EgAq and tF = EgF q are continuous functions of
all parameters and functions involved. Therefore, changing them slightly will change only
slightly the punishment rates. Similarly, crime rates are a continuous function of all the
parameters and functions, and of the punishment rate. Since small changes in parameters
and functions lead to slight changes in punishment, crime will also change slightly.
Proof of Proposition 6. The structure of the proof is as that of Proposition 5.
Continuity has already been shown, so we will only show that D (t;uH ; uL; p)  Bg (Bw (t))
is increasing in uL: For a xed t and u0L > uL, we get B
w (t;u0L) = (u
0
L   u (t) ; uH   u (t))
and Bw (t;uL) = (uL   u (t) ; uH   u (t)) ; so it will su¢ ce to show that
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